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INTRODUCTION:
FUTURE CHALLENGES IN
FAMILY LAW
Family law in the United States faces at least three major
challenges in the next ten years. First is the effort to remove
family law matters from the judicial system through legisla-
tion and court rule. Second is a challenge from other disci-
plines to provide a vehicle for resolution of family disputes
through arbitration or conciliation. And third is the supervi-
sion, discipline and regulation of custody litigation in order
to fully enforce the spirit and the meaning of the Uniform
Child Custody Jurisdiction Act.1
1. Removal from the Judicial System
On November 18, 1982, Chief Justice Warren E. Burger,
speaking at a dinner at New York University, asked, "Do we
need judges initially to resolve the child custody cases and
related domestic disputes? Do we need judges initially in
divorce cases?"'2  The Chief Justice had previously urged
that consideration be given to taking more~controversies out
of the adversary system, saying in an interview that: "There
is no reason why adoptions of children should be in the
courts."3
The Chief Justice's remarks at the midyear meeting of
the American Bar Association on January 27, 1982, (where
his approach for streamlining the judicial system was widely
discussed) included family law as a target for para-judicial
proceedings. Chief Justice Burger said: "Divorce, child cus-
tody, adoptions. . are prime candidates for some form of
administrative or arbitration processes."4 As far back as De-
1. UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT (1968). See also Wis. STAT. ch.
122 (1981-1982).
2. Address by Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, Arthur T. Vanderbilt Dinner,
New York City (Nov. 18, 1982).
3. Interview with Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, Unclogging the Courts - Chief
Justice Speaks Out, U.S. NEws & WORLD REPORT, Feb. 22, 1982, at 36.
4. Address by Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, Annual Report on the State of the
Judiciary, at the Midyear Meeting of the American Bar Association, Chicago, I1.
(Jan. 24, 1982).
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cember, 1976, he suggested that adoption, divorce and child
custody disputes should be handled with judicial review only
if some legal problem arises.5 While noting that these mat-
ters have been handled by courts for centuries, he called for
less traumatic means of settlement which would unburden
the judicial system, and predicted that in the future these
matters of family law will be resolved in new ways.6
2. Extra-Judicial Resolution of Family Disputes
When analyzing alternatives to traditional family law
procedures, the issue of how to protect the interests of the
community and of the children in a nonadversary setting
must be considered. How are the state and the children, who
are real parties in interest, to be represented in an arms-
length arbitration between husbands and wives? Are we
considering the new roles or the lack of roles for interested
parties in the proposed method of dispute resolution? The
rights of all parties, particularly the children, must be
preserved.
As these new procedures are evolving, some questions
which should be raised are: Will the rules of evidence ap-
ply? Do we discard the tested rules established through the
use of precedent? What are the characteristics of the pro-
ceeding, its finality, its binding effect? Will the procedures
protect the public policy of the state as it relates to the integ-
rity of marriage and the rights of children? How do we han-
dle the postdecision disputes? For example, what record
forms the basis for change of circumstances? And what
about judicial review-will the present criteria for review be
followed?
There is some precedent in courts of equity to refer mat-
ters to referees.7 By statute Wisconsin has established the
5. Address by Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, New York University School of
Law Bicentennial Conference on American Law: The Third Century (Apr. 30, 1976).
See also Address by Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, Agenda for 2000 A.D. - Need
for Systematic Anticipation, at the National Conference on the Causes of Popular
Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, St. Paul, Minn. (Apr. 7, 1976).
6. Address by Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, New York University School of
Law Bicentennial Conference on American Law: The Third Century (Apr. 30, 1976).
7. See generally 66 AM. JUR. 2D References §§ 1-45 (1973 & Supp. 1982). See
also FED. R. Civ. P. 53. This rule is derived substantially from the former equity
rules applicable in federal courts. Cf Killingstad v. Meigs, 147 Wis. 511, 133 N.W.
[Vol. 66:433
19831 INTRODUCTION
role of a family court commissioner to hearpendente lite and
postadjudication actions.8 Some states use the traditional
equitable referee for the handling of all domestic relations
matters.9 But this method of relieving calendar congestion
has created other difficulties. Litigants fail to understand
and respect the court appointed referee- because of the infor-
mality of the proceedings and the lack of finality of the deci-
sion. The role of the referee in most instances merely adds a
level of adjudication which is costly and time consuming.
Another reason to remove family litigation from the judi-
cial process is the inability of the system to handle the psy-
chological trauma of separating a family and the decision
making that is required to put the family into a new status.
Even in financial matters, advocates argue, an adversary sys-
tem does not facilitate a healthy ventilating of problems.
Proponents say that direction should be taken from experts
who are skilled in handling interpersonal relationships be-
cause courts simply are not qualified for that role. Profes-
sionals who are trained in social work and psychology could
resolve disputes by arbitration, then recommend a solution
to a court for entry of a final order.10
632 (1911). In this case, which held that a compulsory reference was unauthorized
and that a right to refer an equitable action must be found in the statutes, if it exists,
the court said that:
When the [Wisconsin] constitution was adopted.., it was the common if not
the universal practice of courts of chancery to refer pending causes to a master
in chancery to take testimony. It is quite apparent that this method of trying
equity cases had proved to be unsatisfactory, as well it might, and that it was
the deliberate purpose of the framers of the constitution to make a radical
change in the existing practice. Accordingly, by sec. 19 of art. VII of the con-
stitution, it was provided that "the testimony in causes in equity shall be taken
in like manner as in cases at law, and the office of master in chancery is hereby
prohibited."
I d at 514-15, 133 N.W. at 633.
8. Wis. STAT. § 767.13 (1981-1982).
9. See, ag., W. VA. CODE § 48-2-24 (Michie Supp. 1981).
10. See Possible 1983 Bills, 2 Wis. J. FAm. L. 22 (Dec. 1982). This article de-
scribes a bill which may be introduced into the Wisconsin Legislature in 1983:
One proposal is based upon a concern that parties generally lack equal
knowledge about the divorce, custody, visitation and support laws. The prem-
ise is that the results often times are unnecessary custody battles and litigation,
which is expensive in terms of finances and a strain on the emotions of the
parties and their children.
The proposal being discussed in Madison would require that in every ac-
tion for divorce and legal separation, the Family Court Commissioner would
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A quick glance at the telephone directory in any large
metropolitan area shows a staggering number of businesses
that advertise their expertise in the resolution of family mat-
ters. But there is a serious problem about the qualifications
of some of these alleged professional mediators. Conse-
quently, many communities, through family service organi-
zations, are trying to establish panels of lawyers who are
trained mediators and lawyer-therapist teams. These
schemes present new ethical problems for the bar. Do we
take the traditional family law procedure and relegate it to
some kind of a contract relationship with a third-party medi-
ator which would be binding on the participants and on the
state? If the legal profession is going to allow lawyers to
participate in a lawyer-therapist team to resolve family dis-
putes, we must first address the possible conflict with Canon
5 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which decrees
that "a lawyer should exercise independent professional
judgment on behalf of a client.""
The traditional approach to family law is meant to pro-
tect the legal rights of the parties, of the children and of soci-
ety. Faced with the challenge to relieve overcrowded
calendars and the need for aid from other professionals, our
profession must respond by moving in a positive direction
while preserving the traditional protections found in the ju-
dicial system.
require the parties to participate in mediation with a neutral mediator over
financial issues, child custody and visitation. The mediator would be the
Court Commissioner in financial matters, and the Family Court Counselor in
matters relating to custody and visitation.
The proposal would have the mediation occur after the parties have met
with their attorneys, and specifically consider the Wisconsin Child Support
Guidelines. However, attorneys would not be allowed to be present during the
mediation sessions.
The sessions would supposedly facilitate compromise by educating the par-
ties in the process and the decisions that are likely to be made by the judge
based on agreements reached by the parties.
The proponents of this idea believe that individuals are more likely to co-
operate in decisions that they have had a part in developing. Also, they be-
lieve that the number of unnecessary court custody battles and litigation of
family law cases are likely to be reduced. This would result in less costs and
more expeditious movement of cases through the courts.
Id
11. ABA MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 5 (1979).
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3. Enforcing the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act
So far the legal system is not responding to the problem
created by interstate enforcement of custody disputes. The
Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (U.C.C.J.A.), 2
adopted by forty-eight states,13 is meant to bring a measure
of discipline to diverse child custody proceedings. Yet law-
yers and judges of many jurisdictions have failed to respond
to the purpose and intent of the Act. Unbridled reliance on
the rule of "change of circumstances" available in the en-
forcement forum 14 and the abuse of discretion by trial judges
who do not follow the dictates of the U.C.C.J.A. create
chaos.
Recently, in Steele v. Steele15 the Supreme Court of
Georgia admonished the trial judge for failing to recognize
the dictates of the U.C.C.J.A. adopted in Georgia. 16 The
court said that:
Because a child custody proceeding in this case was
properly pending in Wisconsin, it was improper for a
Georgia court to exercise its jurisdiction. This promotes
the purposes of our Act in Code Ann. § 74-502 by ensuring
an orderly system for child custody determinations while
protecting the best interest of the children before the
court. 
17
12. UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT (1968). See also Wis. STAT. ch.
122 (1981-1982).
13. Dullea, ffP7de Changes in Family Lfe Are Aftering the Family Law, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 7, 1983, at A14, col. 5 (reporting that all states except Massachusetts and
Texas have adopted the U.C.C.J.A.). See generaly Coombs, Interstate Child Custody:
Jurisdiction, Recognition and Enforcement, 66 MINN. L. REv. 711 (1982).
14. See Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610 (1947). In this case Justice Frankfurter in
a concurring opinion explained that:
If there were no question as to the power of Florida to provide for the custody
of this child in the manner in which the Florida decree of divorce did, I think
New York would have to respect what Florida decreed, unless changed condi-
tions affecting the welfare of the child called for a change in custodial care.
New York could respond to such changed circumstances. The child's welfare
must be the controlling consideration whenever a court which can actually lay
hold of a child is appealed to on behalf of the child. Short of that, a valid
custodial decree by Florida could not be set aside simply because a New York
court, on independent consideration, has its own view of what custody would
be appropriate.
Id at 617 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
15. 250 Ga. 101, 296 S.E.2d 570 (1982).
16. GA. CODE ANN. ch. 74-5 (1981).
17. Steele, 250 Ga. at ., 296 S.E.2d at 373.
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In 1979 Mr. Steele filed for divorce in Wisconsin where-
upon Mrs. Steele was awarded temporary custody of their
son. 1 8 The next year Mrs. Steele took the child to Alabama
without the written approval of either Mr. Steele or the
court. 9 Mr. Steele then initiated a contempt action which
Mrs. Steele succeeded in postponing until the final divorce
adjudication. She then moved to Georgia and started a suit
for relief in that state.2 ° In 1981 the courts of Wisconsin and
Georgia issued conflicting orders - Wisconsin awarding the
child to Mr. Steele and Georgia permitting the child to re-
main with Mrs. Steele in that state.2' The Georgia Supreme
Court then heard the case to resolve the jurisdictional issue
and decided that under the U.C.C.J.A. Wisconsin had
proper jurisdiction.22
Judicial tolerance of these activities encourages kidnap-
ping by parents, forum shopping and disrespect for the judi-
cial process. In family law matters lawyers should be aware
of their responsibilities as advocates. We have, however,
ethical responsibilities to follow the rule of law.
4. Conclusion
Extra-judicial proceedings, arbitration and uniform child
custody jurisdiction are emerging themes which will con-
front the bench and bar in the years to come. These are but
three issues which will challenge established patterns of fam-
ily law. The articles which follow in these Family Law is-
sues of the Marquette Law Review will examine still other
problems such as termination of parental rights, joint cus-
tody, valuation of an advanced degree, the plight of the dis-
placed homemaker, continuation of maintenance during
cohabitation and liability for family debts with which the le-
gal profession will continue to grapple.
THE HONORABLE LEANDER J. FOLEY, JR.
CIRCUIT JUDGE, MILWAUKEE COUNTY, WISCONSIN
18. Id at , 296 $.E.2d at 570.
19. Id
20. Id at ., 296 S.E.2d at 571.
21. Id
22. Id at , 296 S.E.2d at 573.
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